A computer scientist looks at game theory
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References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 324-324.
- Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Martin Shubik, 2012.
"What is a Solution to a Matrix Game,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000541, David K. Levine.
- Martin Shubik, 2012. "What Is a Solution to a Matrix Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1866, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Martin Shubik, 2012. "What Is a Solution to a Matrix Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1866R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2013.
- F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Deb, Joyee & Kalai, Ehud, 2015. "Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1041-1055.
- Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.
- repec:eee:ejores:v:264:y:2018:i:1:p:280-293 is not listed on IDEAS
- Martin Shubik, 2011. "The Present and Future of Game Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1808, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2014. "Fault tolerance in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 438-457.
More about this item
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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