What is a Solution to a Matrix Game
These notes are provided to describe many of the problems encountered concerning both structure and behavior in specifying what is meant by the solution to a game of strategy in matrix or strategic form. In the short term in particular, it is often reasonable for the individual to accept as given, both the context in which decisions are being made and the formal structure of the rules of the game. A solution is usually considered as a complete set of equations of motion that when applied to the game at hand selects a final outcome. There are many different theories and conjectures about how games of strategy are, or should be played. Several of them are noted below. They are especially relevant to the experimental gaming facility noted in the companion paper.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997.
"A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium,"
Game Theory and Information
9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
- S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel, 2010. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 572, David K. Levine.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996. "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996.
- Halpern, Joseph Y., 2003.
"A computer scientist looks at game theory,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 114-131, October.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
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