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¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?

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  • Boris Salazar

    () (Universidad del Valle)

Abstract

This paper shows the relevance of Popper's Rationality Principle (RP) for the appraisal of the impressive mass work emerging, in recent years, in the fields of rationality, learning, evolutionary games and behavioral economic theory. In contradistinction to the well-known rigid criteria of the falsacionist Popper, the RP covers a large and diverse spectrum of behaviors compatible with the minimal idea of ‘acting in accordance with the situation’. Its relevance to understand the formation of social conventions or how agents learn ‘to play Nash equilibrium’ is argued at length here.

Suggested Citation

  • Boris Salazar, 2001. "¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 52-77, July-Dece.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:3:y:2001:i:5:p:52-77
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/bsalazar5.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rationality; economic methodology; evolutionary games; social conventions; Nash equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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