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¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?

  • Boris Salazar

    ()

    (Universidad del Valle)

This paper shows the relevance of Popper's Rationality Principle (RP) for the appraisal of the impressive mass work emerging, in recent years, in the fields of rationality, learning, evolutionary games and behavioral economic theory. In contradistinction to the well-known rigid criteria of the falsacionist Popper, the RP covers a large and diverse spectrum of behaviors compatible with the minimal idea of ‘acting in accordance with the situation’. Its relevance to understand the formation of social conventions or how agents learn ‘to play Nash equilibrium’ is argued at length here.

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File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/bsalazar5.pdf
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Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): 5 (July-December)
Pages: 52-77

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Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:3:y:2001:i:5:p:52-77
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  1. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "Evolutionary economics goes mainstream: A review of the theory of learning in games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 423-432.
  2. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1996. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Economics Series 26, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  3. Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2000. "On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0778, Econometric Society.
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  6. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
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  8. Selten,Reinhard, . "Evolution,learning and economic behaviour," Discussion Paper Serie B 132, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Borgers, Tilman, 1996. "On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1374-85, September.
  10. repec:att:wimass:9529 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Colin F. Camerer, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-188, Fall.
  12. George J. Mailath, . ""Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory''," CARESS Working Papres 98-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  13. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
  14. Camerer, Colin, . "Progress and Behavioral Game Theory," Working Papers 1004, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  15. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 2000. "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 1-16, January.
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  17. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9729r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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