Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
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- Cabrales, Antonio, 1999.
"Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 159-184, June.
- Antonio Cabrales, "undated". "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," ELSE working papers 009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Antonio Cabrales, 1996. "Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information," Economics Working Papers 179, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Boris Salazar, 2001. "¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 52-77, July-Dece.
- Bosch-Domenech, Antoni & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2001. "Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 105-137, August.
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KeywordsEvolutionary Games; Cheap Talk; Stability Drift;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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