Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules
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- Golman, Russell & Page, Scott E., 2010. "Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 359-376, March.
- Boyu Zhang & Josef Hofbauer, 2015. "Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 433-448, May.
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More about this item
KeywordsAdjustment dynamics; Attainability; Basins of attraction; Best response dynamics; Coordination game; Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game; Learning; Replicator dynamics; C73;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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