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Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules

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  • Russell Golman
  • Scott Page

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  • Russell Golman & Scott Page, 2010. "Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 49-72, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:20:y:2010:i:1:p:49-72
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-009-0136-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    3. Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
    4. P. Allen & M. Strathern & J. Baldwin, 2007. "Complexity and the limits to learning," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 401-431, August.
    5. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
    6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    7. J. Hofbauer & P. Schuster & K. Sigmund, 2010. "A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 441, David K. Levine.
    8. Swinkels Jeroen M., 1993. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 455-484, July.
    9. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 138-150, October.
    10. Bernard Walliser, 1998. "A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 67-87.
    11. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    12. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-867, May.
    13. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    14. Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
    15. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    16. Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, December.
    17. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
    18. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift And Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 049, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    19. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    20. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    21. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Bednar, Jenna & Jones-Rooy, Andrea & Page, Scott E., 2015. "Choosing a future based on the past: Institutions, behavior, and path dependence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 312-332.
    3. Sawa, Ryoji & Zusai, Dai, 2019. "Evolutionary dynamics in multitasking environments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 288-308.
    4. Edoardo Gaffeo & Mauro Gallegati & Umberto Gostoli, 2015. "An agent-based “proof of principle” for Walrasian macroeconomic theory," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 150-183, June.
    5. Sofia B. S. D. Castro, 2018. "Learning by replicator and best-response: the importance of being indifferent," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 985-999, September.
    6. Golman, Russell & Page, Scott E., 2010. "Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 359-376, March.
    7. Boyu Zhang & Josef Hofbauer, 2015. "Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 433-448, May.
    8. Page, Scott E. & Tassier, Troy, 2010. "A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1229-1242, November.
    9. Sawa, Ryoji & Zusai, Dai, 2014. "Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 562-577.
    10. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    11. A. Yu. Obydenov, 2018. "Mathematical Formalization Of Institutions," Strategic decisions and risk management, Real Economy Publishing House, issue 4.
    12. Dai Zusai, 2018. "Tempered best response dynamics," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 1-34, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adjustment dynamics; Attainability; Basins of attraction; Best response dynamics; Coordination game; Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game; Learning; Replicator dynamics; C73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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