IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs

We consider four models of evolution and learning in games which rely on perturbations of payoffs, including stochastic fictitious play. In all cases, we establish global stability results for zerosum games, games with an interior ESS, potential games, and supermodular games.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0205.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0205.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2001
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0205
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
  2. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
  3. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  5. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1995. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9529, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Donald A. Walker (ed.), 2000. "Equilibrium," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 1585.
  8. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1981. "Qualitative Response Models: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1483-1536, December.
  9. Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2000. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  10. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
  11. Chen, H.-C. & Friedman, J. W. & Thisse, J.-F., "undated". "Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1248, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
  13. Ianni, Antonella, 2000. "Learning correlated equilibria in potential games," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0012, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  14. R. Pemantle, 2010. "Non-convergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 483, David K. Levine.
  15. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  16. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
  17. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  18. Lawrence E. Blume, 1994. "How Noise Matters," Game Theory and Information 9407002, EconWPA, revised 27 Jul 1994.
  19. Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000. "Evolution with diverse preferences," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  20. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 1998. "On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 79-96, October.
  21. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  22. Larry E. Blume, 1996. "Population Games," Working Papers 96-04-022, Santa Fe Institute.
  23. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
  24. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  25. repec:hhs:iuiwop:534 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 138-150, October.
  27. J. Robinson, 1969. "An Iterative Method of Solving a Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 422, David K. Levine.
  28. D. Foster & P. Young, 2010. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 493, David K. Levine.
  29. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  30. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional Learning," Virginia Economics Online Papers 327, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  31. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paper Administrator)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.