From Economic Activity to Understanding Spaces
This paper constructs the probability space underlying the random variable of any time dependent econometric specification. The construction links concrete economic activity, both perceived and recorded, and econometric formulations. Furthermore, it is argued that the probability events belonging to this space are forms of understanding economic activity held by each agent. The model establishes two aspects of any econometric formulation. Mainly, that learning must be unique between any two ticks of the clock and that not all forms of understandings can indeed become events in the random variable’s probability space. Finally, a model of the dependencies based on agent-based understandings, and evolution thereof, is presented as well.
|Date of creation:||17 Mar 2003|
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