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Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals

Listed author(s):
  • Eric S. Maskin

    ()

    (School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study)

Eric S. Maskin delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.

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Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0081.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0081
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  1. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-1151, November.
  2. Baliga, Sandeep & Maskin, Eric, 2003. "Mechanism design for the environment," Handbook of Environmental Economics,in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 305-324 Elsevier.
  3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 49-67.
  4. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
  5. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  6. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
  7. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
  8. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  9. Oskar Lange, 1936. "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 53-71.
  10. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
  11. Laffont, Jean-Jacques M, 1985. "On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-29, January.
  12. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
  13. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
  14. Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, October.
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