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Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals

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  • Eric S. Maskin

Abstract

Eric S. Maskin delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Eric S. Maskin, 2008. "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 567-576, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:567-76
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.567
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-1151, November.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 49-67.
    3. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
    4. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    5. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    6. Oskar Lange, 1936. "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 53-71.
    7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques M, 1985. "On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-29, January.
    8. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
    9. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
    10. Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, October.
    11. Baliga, Sandeep & Maskin, Eric, 2003. "Mechanism design for the environment," Handbook of Environmental Economics,in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 305-324 Elsevier.
    12. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    13. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    14. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Major, Iván, 2014. "Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén?
      [When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmetric info
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 148-165.
    2. Johann K. Brunner, 2010. "Rationalität und Effizienz - einige Lehren aus der Verhaltensökonomik für die Wohlfahrtstheorie," Economics working papers 2010-12, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    3. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Hennessy & David L. Kelly, 2017. "Markets vs. Mechanisms," Working Papers 2017-11, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    4. repec:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0410-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke, 2012. "Market design in Chinese market places," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 525-546, September.
    6. Bauer, Johannes M., 2014. "Platforms, systems competition, and innovation: Reassessing the foundations of communications policy," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 662-673.
    7. Cato, Susumu, 2012. "A note on the extension of a binary relation on a set to the power set," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 46-48.
    8. Michael Howlett, 2014. "From the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ policy design: design thinking beyond markets and collaborative governance," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 47(3), pages 187-207, September.
    9. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 2014. "Macroeconomics after the crisis – hedgehog or fox?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9974, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Manitra A. Rakotoarisoa, 2016. "Trade with Endogenous Market Power Under Asymmetric and Incomplete Information," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 423-440, December.
    11. Mercado, Ruben, 2013. "Development indices, inequality, and applied development policy analysis: some issues for discussion," MPRA Paper 58018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. J. Patrick Gunning, 2010. "Incentive Divergence and the Global Financial Crisis," Chapters,in: Macroeconomic Theory and its Failings, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Martin Shubik, 2011. "The Present and Future of Game Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1808, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    14. Philippos Louis & Matias Núñez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018. "Beyond Outcomes: Experimental Evidence on the Value of Agreement," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 05-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    15. Kornai, János, 2013. "Bevezetés a Központosítás és piaci reform című kötethez
      [Introduction to the volume Centralization and Market Reform]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 253-281.
    16. Smith, Eric & Shubik, Martin, 2011. "Endogenizing the provision of money: Costs of commodity and fiat monies in relation to the value of trade," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 508-530.
    17. mercado, p. ruben & porta, fernando, 2012. "Development planning in the xxi century? a note on old and new methods and tools," MPRA Paper 58610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Zhang, Yongfeng & Zhao, Qi & Zhang, Yi & Friedman, Daniel & Zhang, Min & Liu, Yiqun & Ma, Shaoping, 2016. "Economic recommendation with surplus maximization," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship Market Design: Theory and Pragmatics SP II 2016-502, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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