Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals
Eric S. Maskin delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Volume (Year): 98 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001.
5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,"
1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
- Baliga, Sandeep & Maskin, Eric, 2003.
"Mechanism design for the environment,"
Handbook of Environmental Economics,
in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 305-324
- Sandeep Baliga & Eric Maskin, 2003. "Mechanism Design for the Environment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000341, David K. Levine.
- Sandeep Baliga & Eric Maskin, 2002. "Mechanism Design for the Environment," Economics Working Papers 0024, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques M, 1985. "On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 49-67.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003.
"The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,"
Economics Working Papers
0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-51, November.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
- Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, October.
- Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 263-82, April.
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