Three Minimal Market Institutions: Theory and Experimental Evidence
In this experiment we examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games relative to theoretical predictions. These models of a closed exchange economy with monetary and financial structures have limited amounts of cash to facilitate transactions. Subsequent experiments will deal with credit limitations, banking and credit, the role of clearinghouses and the possibility for the universal issue of credit by individuals. In theory, with enough money the non-cooperative equilibria should converge to the respective competitive equilibria as the number of players increases. Since general equilibrium theory abstracts away from the market mechanism, it makes no predictions about how the paths of convergence to the CE may differ across market mechanisms. GE allows no role for money or credit. In contrast to most market experiments conducted in open or partial equilibrium settings, we report on closed settings that include feedbacks. Laboratory examination of the three market mechanisms reveals convergence to CE with increasing number of players. It also reveals significant differences in the convergence paths across the mechanisms, suggesting that to the extent deviations from CE are of interest (either because the number of players in the environment of substantive interest is small, or because disequilibrium behavior itself is of substantive interest), theoretical abstraction from the market mechanisms has been taken too far. For example, the oligopoly effect of feedback from buying a good that the player is endowed with is missed. Inclusion of mechanism differences into theory would help us understand markets better.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: PO Box 8268, New Haven CT 06520-8268|
Phone: (203) 432-3576
Fax: (203) 432-5779
Web page: http://www.econ.yale.edu/ddp/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marimon, R. & Sunder, S., 1993.
"Expectations and Learning under Alternative Monetary Regimes: An Experimental Approach,"
189, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
- Marimon, Ramon & Sunder, Shyam, 1994. "Expectations and Learning under Alternative Monetary Regimes: An Experimental Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 131-62, January.
- Ramon Marimon & Shyam Sunder, 1993. "Expectations and learning under alternative monetary regimes: An experimental approach," Economics Working Papers 37, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Competitive Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 577-85, May.
- Pradeep Dubey & Martin Shubik, 1979. "A Strategic Market Game with Price and Quantity Strategies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 521, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ramon Marimon & Stephen E. Spear & Shyam Sunder, 1992.
"Expectationally-driven market volatility: an experimental study,"
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics
73, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Marimon Ramon & Spear Stephen E. & Sunder Shyam, 1993. "Expectationally Driven Market Volatility: An Experimental Study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 74-103, October.
- Marimon, R. & Spear, S. & Sunder, S., 1991. "Expectationally-Driven Market Volatility: An Experimental Study," GSIA Working Papers 1991-3, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Ramon Marimon & Stephen E. Spear & Shyam Sunder, 1993. "Expectationally-driven market volatility: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 21, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
- R. Cont, 2001. "Empirical properties of asset returns: stylized facts and statistical issues," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 223-236.
- Plott, Charles R & Sunder, Shyam, 1982.
"Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 663-98, August.
- Plott, Charles R. & Sunder, Shyam., . "Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational Expectations Models," Working Papers 331, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Bosch, A. & Sunder, S., 1994.
"Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium,"
GSIA Working Papers
1994-11, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Antoni Bosch-Domenech & Shyam Sunder, 2000. "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 16(3), pages 257-284, December.
- Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Shyam Sunder, 1996. "Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 91, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Shyam NMI Sunder & Antoni Bosch-Domènech, 2001. "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm204, Yale School of Management.
- Sorin, S., 1994.
"Strategic Market Games with Exchange Rates,"
9411, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 2004. "Gold, Fiat and Credit. An Elementary Discussion of Commodity Money, Fiat Money and Credit, Part II," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1460, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-37, February.
- V. Plerou & P. Gopikrishnan & L. A. N. Amaral & M. Meyer & H. E. Stanley, 1999. "Scaling of the distribution of price fluctuations of individual companies," Papers cond-mat/9907161, arXiv.org.
- Dhananjay K. & Shyam Sunder & Stephen Spear, 2004. "Convergence of Double Auctions to Pareto Optimal Allocations in the Edgeworth Box," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2518, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Apr 2008.
- Benoit Mandelbrot, 1963. "The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36, pages 394.
- Marimon, Ramon & Sunder, Shyam, 1993.
"Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1073-107, September.
- Ramon Marimon & Shyam Sunder, 1993. "Indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world: Experimental evidence," Economics Working Papers 25, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Dhananjay K. Gode & Shyam Sunder, 1997. "What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 603-630.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
- Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2007. "Eeryone-a-banker or the Ideal Credit Acceptance Game: Theory and Evidence," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001397, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:yaleco:27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.