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The Value of Fiat Money with an Outside Bank: An Experimental Game

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  • Juergen Huber
  • Martin Shubik
  • Shyam Sunder

Abstract

Why people accept intrinsically worthless fiat money in exchange for real goods and services has been a longstanding question. There are many competing sufficient explanations that may confound each other in practice but can be individually tested in isolation experimentally. In this paper we examine a sufficient explanation of the value of fiat money through the existence of a debt instrument which allows consumption to be moved earlier in time. We present experimental evidence that the theoretical predictions about the behavior of such economies work reasonably well in a laboratory setting. The import of this finding for the theory of money is to show that the presence of a societal bank and default laws provide sufficient structure to support the use of fiat money, although many other institutions such as taxation provide alternatives.
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  • Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2009. "The Value of Fiat Money with an Outside Bank: An Experimental Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000145, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    2. Hahn, F H, 1971. "Equilibrium with Transaction Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(3), pages 417-439, May.
    3. Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-137, February.
    4. Martin Shubik, 1978. "The Capital Stock Modified Competitive Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 507, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William Sudderth & John Geanakoplos, 2006. "The inflationary bias of real uncertainty and the harmonic Fisher equation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 481-512, August.
    6. Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2007. "Three Minimal Market Institutions: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 27, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    7. Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2010. "Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 403-424, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Angerer & Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2010. "An economy with personal currency: theory and experimental evidence," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 475-509, October.
    2. Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2009. "Default Penalty as a Disciplinary and Selection Mechanism in Presence of Multiple Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1730, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2010. "Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 403-424, November.
    4. Martin Angerer & Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2007. "An Economy with Personal Currency: Theory and Evidence," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2448, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jan 2009.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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