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Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale

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Abstract

We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market, with one positive-value bidder, and either one or two speculators who may choose simultaneously whether to enter the auction. We show that the bidder accommodates speculators by reducing demand in the auction and subsequently purchasing in the resale market, which encourages entry by speculators. The presence of multiple speculators induces each speculator to enter less often, but increases competition in the auction and the auction price. Speculators earn positive profits on average, except when multiple speculators enter the auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Pagnozzi & Krista J. Saral, 2017. "Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale," CSEF Working Papers 475, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:475
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    1. Saral, Krista Jabs, 2012. "Speculation and demand reduction in English clock auctions with resale," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 416-431.
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    4. Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2019. "Efficiency in auctions with (failed) resale," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 254-273.
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    Cited by:

    1. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017. "Auctions with bid credits and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 58-90.
    2. Garratt, Rodney & Georganas, Sotiris, 2021. "Auctions with speculators: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 256-270.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    speculators; entry; multi-object auctions; resale; economic experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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