Auctions with external incentives: Experimental evidence
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References listed on IDEAS
- Lange, Andreas & List, John A. & Price, Michael K., 2011.
"Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: Evidence from the lab and field,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 54-64, January.
- Andreas Lange & John List & Michael Price, 2010. "Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Evidence from the Lab and Field," Artefactual Field Experiments 00474, The Field Experiments Website.
- Andreas Lange & John A. List & Michael K. Price, 2010. "Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Evidence from the Lab and Field," NBER Working Papers 16360, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Georganas, Sotiris & Kagel, John, 2011. "Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 359-371, January.
- Timothy Salmon & Bart Wilson, 2008. "Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 47-67, January.
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KeywordsAuctions; signaling; disclosure; experiments.;
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2016-06-04 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2016-06-04 (Experimental Economics)
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