Auctions with external incentives: Experimental evidence
We consider auctions where bidders have external incentives and focus on the case where their valuations in the auction are positively correlated with their productivity which matters in a second stage job market. We study how this affects bidding behavior and wages in the job market and proceed to test the model’s implication in an experiment where treatments differ according to which bids are disclosed. Our results broadly confirm the theoretical prediction that bidders tend to overbid, and their bidding behavior and wages are influenced by the disclosure rule. The data also suggests that the dispersion in worker wages is affected by the disclosure rule, suggesting the importance of reputational bidding.
|Date of creation:||2016|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU|
Phone: (01392) 263218
Fax: (01392) 263242
Web page: http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/about/departments/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lange, Andreas & List, John A. & Price, Michael K., 2011.
"Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: Evidence from the lab and field,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 54-64, January.
- Andreas Lange & John List & Michael Price, 2010. "Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Evidence from the Lab and Field," Artefactual Field Experiments 00474, The Field Experiments Website.
- Andreas Lange & John A. List & Michael K. Price, 2010. "Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Evidence from the Lab and Field," NBER Working Papers 16360, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy Salmon & Bart Wilson, 2008. "Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 47-67, January.
- Georganas, Sotiris & Kagel, John, 2011. "Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 359-371, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)