A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes
Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for incentive-compatible elicitations of subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how they can be generalized to modern ("non-expected utility") theories of risk and ambiguity, yielding mutual benefits: users of scoring rules can benefit from the empirical realism of non-expected utility, and analysts of ambiguity attitudes can benefit from efficient measurements using proper scoring rules. An experiment demonstrates the feasibility of our generalization. Copyright 2009, Wiley-Blackwell.
Volume (Year): 76 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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