Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence
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- Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2017. "Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-053/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Jul 2017.
- Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2017. "Signaling in auctions: experimental evidence," Working Papers Department of Economics 585499, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsauctions; signalling; experiments;
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
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