Charitable asymmetric bidders
Recent papers show that all-pay auctions are better at raising money for charity than first-price auctions with symmetric bidders and under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders and under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We find that all-pay auctions still earn more money than first-price auction. Thus, all-pay auctions should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.
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