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Olivier Bos

Personal Details

First Name:Olivier
Middle Name:
Last Name:Bos
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pbo457
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://olivier-bos.com/
Twitter: @olivierbos
Mastodon: @olivierbos@econtwitter.net
Terminal Degree:2009 Paris School of Economics (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(95%) Centre for Economics at Paris-Saclay (CEPS)
Graduate School of Economics and Management
Université Paris-Saclay

Saint-Aubin, France
https://www.ceps-paris-saclay.fr/
RePEc:edi:epevrfr (more details at EDIRC)

(5%) Département de sciences sociales
École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay (ENS)

Cachan, France
http://sociens.ens-paris-saclay.fr/
RePEc:edi:dsencfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2022. "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," Post-Print hal-04469151, HAL.
  2. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2022. "Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling," CESifo Working Paper Series 9900, CESifo.
  3. Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_158, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  4. Olivier Bos, 2020. "Charitable asymmetric bidders," Post-Print hal-04129340, HAL.
  5. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020. "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series 8650, CESifo.
  6. Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2018. "Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets," Post-Print hal-04134778, HAL.
  7. Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2018. "Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 7261, CESifo.
  8. BOS, Olivier & TRUYTS, Tom, 2014. "Auctions with prestige motives," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Bos, Olivier & Ranger, Martin, 2013. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," MPRA Paper 47587, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," CESifo Working Paper Series 4345, CESifo.
  11. Olivier Bos, 2012. "Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition," Post-Print hal-01079504, HAL.
  12. Bos, O & P. Schweinzer, 2012. "Risk pooling in redistributive agreements," Discussion Papers 12/17, Department of Economics, University of York.
  13. BOS, Olivier, 2011. "How lotteries outperform auctions," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2321, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Olivier Bos, 2010. "Wars of Attrition with Stochastic Competition," Working Paper Series in Economics 47, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  15. BOS, Olivier, 2009. "How lotteries outperform auctions for charity," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. BOS, Olivier & RANGER, Martin, 2009. "All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Olivier Bos, 2008. "Charity Auctions for the Happy Few," CESifo Working Paper Series 2398, CESifo.

Articles

  1. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2023. "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 423-450, June.
  2. Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021. "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 448-469.
  3. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Auctions with signaling concerns," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 420-448, May.
  4. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Effets de réputation dans les enchères : l’inégalité des perdants," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 72(3), pages 443-458.
  5. Olivier Bos, 2020. "Charitable asymmetric bidders," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(2), pages 320-337, April.
  6. Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2018. "Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 129, pages 127-144.
  7. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2016. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(4), pages 785-815, October.
  8. Bos, Olivier, 2016. "Charity auctions for the happy few," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 83-92.
  9. Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2014. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 115-116, pages 361-377.
  10. Bos, Olivier, 2012. "Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 83-91.
  11. Olivier Bos, 2011. "L'enchère à offres payantes. Un mécanisme aux applications diverses," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 62(1), pages 5-28.
  12. Bos, Olivier, 2011. "How lotteries outperform auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 262-264, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2022. "Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling," CESifo Working Paper Series 9900, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi & Zeng, Xianjie, 2023. "Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

  2. Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_158, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2017. "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," MPRA Paper 79181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
    3. Jibang Wu & Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru & Haifeng Xu, 2021. "Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders," Papers 2109.04888, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.

  3. Olivier Bos, 2020. "Charitable asymmetric bidders," Post-Print hal-04129340, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Wasser, Cédric, 2013. "Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 350-368.

  4. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020. "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series 8650, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi & Zeng, Xianjie, 2023. "Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    2. Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Post-Print hal-04120443, HAL.
    3. BOS, Olivier & TRUYTS, Tom, 2016. "Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2016017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Cho, Myeonghwan & Song, Joon, 2022. "Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

  5. Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2018. "Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 7261, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Miguel A. Fonseca & Francesco Giovannoni & Miltiadis Makris, 2020. "Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1003-1043, December.

  6. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," CESifo Working Paper Series 4345, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Bard Harstad, 2009. "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," Discussion Papers 1474, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Molina, Chai & Akcay, Erol & Dieckmann, Ulf & Levin, Simon & Rovenskaya, Elena A., 2018. "Combating climate change with matching-commitment agreements," SocArXiv 7yc3g, Center for Open Science.
    3. Llerena, D. & Roussillon, B. & Teyssier, S. & Buckley, P. & Delinchant, B. & Ferrari, J. & Laranjeira, T. & Wurtz, F., 2021. "Demand response in the workplace: A field experiment," Working Papers 2021-01, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    4. Heidelmeier, Lisa & Sahm, Marco, 2023. "A Vertically Differentiated Duopoly Model with Environmental Awards," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277635, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  7. Olivier Bos, 2012. "Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition," Post-Print hal-01079504, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Kirchkamp & Wladislaw Mill, 2019. "Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding," CESifo Working Paper Series 7631, CESifo.
    2. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw, 2021. "Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 616-635.
    3. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2021. "Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions," Papers 2110.08563, arXiv.org.
    4. Lang, Matthias & Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2014. "Deadlines in stochastic contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 134-142.

  8. BOS, Olivier, 2011. "How lotteries outperform auctions," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2321, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Sander Onderstal & Arthur J.C. Schram & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2011. "Bidding to give in the Field: Door-to-Door Fundraisers had it right from the Start," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-070/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 10 Nov 2011.
    2. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2014. "Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 437-464, February.
    3. Gregor, Martin, 2012. "Contest for power in organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 280-283.
    4. Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014. "Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-12.
    5. Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Post-Print hal-04120443, HAL.
    6. Olivier Bos, 2010. "Charity Auctions for the Happy Few," Working Paper Series in Economics 45, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    7. Paan Jindapon & Zhe Yang, 2020. "Free riders and the optimal prize in public‐good funding lotteries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1289-1312, September.
    8. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    9. Onderstal, Sander & Schram, Arthur J.H.C. & Soetevent, Adriaan R., 2014. "Reprint of: Bidding to give in the field," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 87-100.
    10. Damianov, Damian S., 2015. "Should lotteries offer discounts on multiple tickets?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 84-86.
    11. Damian S. Damianov & Ronald Peeters, 2018. "Prize‐Based Mechanisms For Fund‐Raising: Theory And Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1562-1584, July.
    12. Brookins, Philip & Jindapon, Paan, 2021. "Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    13. Embrey, M.S. & Mengel, F. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2012. "Strategic commitment and cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes," Research Memorandum 051, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    14. Onderstal, Sander & Schram, Arthur J.H.C. & Soetevent, Adriaan R., 2013. "Bidding to give in the field," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 72-85.

  9. BOS, Olivier & RANGER, Martin, 2009. "All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2014. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 115-116, pages 361-377.
    2. Nicola Dimitri, 2012. "Service On the “Exclusion Principle” in all-pay auctions with incomplete information," Working Papers 2012/50, Maastricht School of Management.

  10. Olivier Bos, 2008. "Charity Auctions for the Happy Few," CESifo Working Paper Series 2398, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Gregor, Martin, 2012. "Contest for power in organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 280-283.
    2. Olivier Bos, 2010. "Charity Auctions for the Happy Few," Working Paper Series in Economics 45, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    3. Olivier Bos, 2011. "How lotteries outperform auctions," Post-Print hal-01079501, HAL.
    4. Paan Jindapon & Zhe Yang, 2020. "Free riders and the optimal prize in public‐good funding lotteries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1289-1312, September.
    5. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2013. "Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 267-277.

Articles

  1. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2023. "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 423-450, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021. "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 448-469.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Auctions with signaling concerns," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 420-448, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Olivier Bos, 2020. "Charitable asymmetric bidders," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(2), pages 320-337, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2016. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(4), pages 785-815, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Bos, Olivier, 2016. "Charity auctions for the happy few," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 83-92.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Bos, Olivier, 2012. "Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 83-91.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Bos, Olivier, 2011. "How lotteries outperform auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 262-264, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 19 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (13) 2011-11-28 2013-06-24 2014-09-29 2014-12-24 2015-12-08 2016-06-18 2016-11-06 2017-05-28 2020-03-09 2020-11-30 2021-03-22 2022-07-18 2022-10-24. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (10) 2014-09-29 2014-12-24 2016-11-06 2017-05-28 2020-03-09 2020-11-30 2021-03-22 2021-05-03 2022-07-18 2022-10-24. Author is listed
  3. NEP-DES: Economic Design (9) 2017-06-25 2017-07-16 2018-11-05 2020-03-09 2020-11-30 2021-03-22 2021-05-03 2022-07-18 2022-10-24. Author is listed
  4. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (4) 2017-06-25 2017-07-16 2018-11-05 2021-05-03
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (3) 2010-03-06 2011-07-13 2014-09-29
  6. NEP-CUL: Cultural Economics (2) 2014-12-24 2020-11-30
  7. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2016-06-18 2022-07-18
  8. NEP-DEM: Demographic Economics (1) 2022-07-18
  9. NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2014-09-29

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