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Deadlines in stochastic contests

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  • Lang, Matthias
  • Seel, Christian
  • Strack, Philipp

Abstract

We consider a two-player contest model in which breakthroughs arrive according to privately observed Poisson processes. Each player’s process continues as long as she exerts costly effort. The player who collects the most breakthroughs until a predetermined deadline wins a prize.

Suggested Citation

  • Lang, Matthias & Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2014. "Deadlines in stochastic contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 134-142.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:52:y:2014:i:c:p:134-142
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina, 2020. "Designing Dynamic Research Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 270-289, November.
    2. Letina, Igor & Benkert, Jean-Michel, 2016. "Designing Dynamic Research Tournaments," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145738, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Christian Seel, 2018. "Contests with endogenous deadlines," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 119-133, March.
    4. Kostas Bimpikis & Shayan Ehsani & Mohamed Mostagir, 2019. "Designing Dynamic Contests," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 339-356, March.
    5. C. Gizem Korpeoglu & Ersin Körpeoğlu & Sıdıka Tunç, 2021. "Optimal Duration of Innovation Contests," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 657-675, May.
    6. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
    7. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8144-8165, November.
    8. Xu Tian & Gongbing Bi, 2022. "Multiplicative output form and its applications to problems in the homogenous innovation contest model," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 44(3), pages 709-732, September.

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