Gambling in Contests
This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Contrary to the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. In equilibrium, the trade-off between risk and reward causes a non-monotonicity: highest expected losses occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2008.
"Caller Number Five and Related Timing Games,"
tecipa-317, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991.
"The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2010.
"The War of Information,"
9-13-2010, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Hans K. Hvide, 2000.
"Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0163, Econometric Society.
- Axel Anderson & Luís M. B. Cabral, 2007.
"Go for broke or play it safe? Dynamic competition with choice of variance,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 593-609, 09.
- Anderson, Axel & Cabral, Luís M B, 2004. "Go For Broke or Play it Safe? Dynamic Competition with Choice of Variance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christopher Harris & John Vickers, 1987. "Racing with Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 1-21.
- Lones Smith & Giuseppe Moscarini, 2007. "Optimal Dynamic Contests," 2007 Meeting Papers 249, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-60, July.
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
- Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July.
- Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
- Pedersen, J. L. & Peskir, G., 2001. "The Azéma-Yor embedding in non-singular diffusions," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 305-312, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:375. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tamilla Benkelberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.