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Gambling in contests with regret

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  • Han Feng
  • David Hobson

Abstract

This paper discusses the gambling contest introduced in Seel & Strack (Gambling in contests, Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 375, Mar 2012.) and considers the impact of adding a penalty associated with failure to follow a winning strategy. The Seel & Strack model consists of $n$-agents each of whom privately observes a transient diffusion process and chooses when to stop it. The player with the highest stopped value wins the contest, and each player's objective is to maximise their probability of winning the contest. We give a new derivation of the results of Seel & Strack based on a Lagrangian approach. Moreover, we consider an extension of the problem in which in the case when an agent is penalised when their strategy is suboptimal, in the sense that they do not win the contest, but there existed an alternative strategy which would have resulted in victory.

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  • Han Feng & David Hobson, 2013. "Gambling in contests with regret," Papers 1301.0719, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1301.0719
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Suleyman Basak & Dmitry Makarov, 2014. "Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(1), pages 179-217, February.
    2. Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2013. "Gambling in contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2033-2048.
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