Gambling in contests with regret
This paper discusses the gambling contest introduced in Seel & Strack (Gambling in contests, Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 375, Mar 2012.) and considers the impact of adding a penalty associated with failure to follow a winning strategy. The Seel & Strack model consists of $n$-agents each of whom privately observes a transient diffusion process and chooses when to stop it. The player with the highest stopped value wins the contest, and each player's objective is to maximise their probability of winning the contest. We give a new derivation of the results of Seel & Strack based on a Lagrangian approach. Moreover, we consider an extension of the problem in which in the case when an agent is penalised when their strategy is suboptimal, in the sense that they do not win the contest, but there existed an alternative strategy which would have resulted in victory.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2012.
"Gambling in Contests,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
375, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Suleyman Basak & Dmitry Makarov, 2009.
"Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management,"
w0158, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
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