Gambling in contests
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- Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2012. "Gambling in Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 375, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Seel, Christian, 2015. "Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 154-157.
- Seel, Christian & Stracky, Philipp, 2014. "Continuous Time Contests with Private Information," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100527, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Han Feng & David Hobson, 2013. "Gambling in contests with regret," Papers 1301.0719, arXiv.org.
- Han Feng & David Hobson, 2015. "Gambling in contests modelled with diffusions," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 38(1), pages 21-37, April.
- Han Feng & David Hobson, 2014. "Gambling in contests with random initial law," Papers 1405.7801, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2016.
- Lang, Matthias & Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2014. "Deadlines in stochastic contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 134-142.
More about this item
KeywordsDiscontinuous games; Contests; Relative performance pay; Risk-taking behavior;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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