Continuous Time Contests with Private Information
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "To fight or to give up? Dynamic contests with a deadline," Working Papers wp2020_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana (D.) Sisak, 2018. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-041/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Mendel, Moritz & Pieroth, Ferdinand & Seel, Christian, 2019. "Your Failure is My Opportunity - Eff ects of Elimination in Contests," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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