Continuois Time Contests
This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. Applications of the model include procurement contests and competitions for grants. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium outcome, even if players have to choose bounded stopping times. We derive the equilibrium distribution in closed form. If the noise vanishes, the equilibrium outcome converges to - and thus selects - the symmetric equilibrium outcome of an all-pay auction. For two players and constant costs, each playerâ€™s profits increase if costs for both players increase, variance increases, or drift decreases. Intuitively, patience becomes a more important factor for contest success, which reduces informational rents.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2012|
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- Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995.
"The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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- Park, Andreas & Smith, Lones, 2008.
"Caller Number Five and related timing games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.
- Anderson, Axel & Cabral, Luís M B, 2004.
"Go For Broke or Play it Safe? Dynamic Competition with Choice of Variance,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Axel Anderson & Luís M. B. Cabral, 2007. "Go for broke or play it safe? Dynamic competition with choice of variance," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 593-609, 09.
- Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 872-90, September.
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