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Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs

Author

Listed:
  • Philipp Denter
  • John Morgan
  • Dana Sisak

Abstract

We analyze the incentives for showing off, which we model as a costly signaling game, and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest, a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium, costly signaling of ability occurs only when the newcomer is exceptionally talented. In such situations signaling benefits both contestants: the newcomer for obvious reasons; the incumbent by economizing on wasted effort in the contest. Our results rationalize the emergence of norms against showing off in settings where total effort is important. When selection efficiency matters, such norms decrease welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana Sisak, 2022. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 529-580, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:1:p:529-80
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190234
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    Cited by:

    1. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2025. "Repeated contests with commitment types," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    2. Yuxi Chen & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2026. "Overconfidence and strategic behavior in elimination contests: implications for CEO selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 30(1), pages 1-44, February.
    3. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    5. Sharma, Priyanka & Wagman, Liad, 2020. "Advertising and Voter Data in Asymmetric Political Contests," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    6. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2025. "Know thy enemy: Information acquisition in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    8. Lian, Zeng & Xu, Shuo & Zheng, Jie, 2025. "Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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