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Repeated contests with commitment types

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  • Barbieri, Stefano
  • Serena, Marco

Abstract

Contestants fight in repeated contests and privately know whether they are rational utility maximizers or automatons committed to always fighting “all-in.” In the unique symmetric equilibrium, rational contestants fight all-in in early contests as doing so buys a beneficial “all-in look” that intimidates rivals in future contests. In equilibrium, several structural differences emerge between periods in which multiple contestants maintain an all-in look, as opposed to one: most prominently, only in the former case aggregate efforts may exceed the per-period prize, and only in the latter payoffs can be positive.

Suggested Citation

  • Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2025. "Repeated contests with commitment types," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:177:y:2025:i:c:s0014292125001059
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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