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The war of attrition with incomplete information

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  • Ponsati, Clara
  • Sakovics, Jozsef

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  • Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1995. "The war of attrition with incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 239-254, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:29:y:1995:i:3:p:239-254
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    1. Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1996. "Multiperson Bargaining over Two Alternatives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 226-244, February.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-960, July.
    3. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    4. Hendricks, Ken & Weiss, Andrew & Wilson, Charles A, 1988. "The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(4), pages 663-680, November.
    5. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
    6. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
    7. Ponsati, C. & Sakovics, J., 1992. "Mediation Is Necessary for Efficient Bargaining," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 194.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    8. Kalyan Chatterjee & Larry Samuelson, 1987. "Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 175-192.
    9. Janusz A. Ordover & Ariel Rubinstein, 1986. "A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 879-888.
    10. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.
    11. repec:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:25-26:p:04 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Clara Ponsati, 1992. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Bargaining over Many Issues," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 25-26, pages 81-100.
    13. J. Maynard Smith, 2010. "The Theory of Games and Evolution of Animal Conflicts," Levine's Working Paper Archive 448, David K. Levine.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
    2. Manzini, Paola & Ponsatí, Clara, 2001. "Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes," IZA Discussion Papers 395, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. LaCasse, Chantale & Ponsati, Clara & Barham, Vicky, 2002. "Chores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 237-281, May.
    4. Manzini, Paola & Ponsati, Clara, 2005. "Stakeholders in bilateral conflict," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 166-180, September.
    5. Schweinzer, Paul, 2010. "Sequential bargaining with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 109-121, January.
    6. Asako Yasushi, 2015. "One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 313-331, July.
    7. Tullio Gregori, 2009. "Currency crisis duration and interest defence," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(3), pages 256-267.
    8. Georgy Egorov & Bård Harstad, 2017. "Private Politics and Public Regulation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1652-1682.
    9. Lian Xue & Stefania Sitzia & Theodore L. Turocy, 2022. "Concord and contention in a dynamic unstructured bargaining experiment with costly conflict," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 22-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    10. Metzger, Lars Peter, 2014. "Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 160-166.
    11. Kyungmin Kim & Frances Zhiyun Xu Lee, 2014. "Information Acquisition in a War of Attrition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 37-78, May.
    12. Ponsati, Clara, 1995. "The deadline effect: A theoretical note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 281-285, June.
    13. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
    14. Weng, Xi, 2015. "Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 49-62.
    15. Maxime MENUET, 2016. "Does Overconfidence Drag Out War?," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2394, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    16. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsat?Author-Name: Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 502.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    17. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
    18. Xue, Lian & Sitzia, Stefania & Turocy, Theodore L., 2023. "Concord and contention in a dynamic unstructured bargaining experiment with costly conflict," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    19. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    20. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella, 2005. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 17-37, January.
    21. Jarque, Xavier & Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2003. "Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 803-830, September.
    22. Li, Hongcheng, 2019. "Multi-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 109511, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Aug 2021.
    23. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Strategic disclosure of feasible options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 145-165.
    24. Özyurt Selçuk, 2016. "Building Reputation in a War of Attrition Game: Hawkish or Dovish Stance?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 797-816, June.

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