The war of attrition with incomplete information
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Manzini, Paola & Ponsatí, Clara, 2001. "Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes," IZA Discussion Papers 395, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- LaCasse, Chantale & Ponsati, Clara & Barham, Vicky, 2002. "Chores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 237-281, May.
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- Asako Yasushi, 2015. "One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 313-331, July.
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- Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella, 2005. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 17-37, January.
- Jarque, Xavier & Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2003.
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- Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsati & Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," ESE Discussion Papers 75, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Strategic disclosure of feasible options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 145-165.
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