Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1
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- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions," Working Papers 10.01, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
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- J. Amegashie, 2011. "Incomplete property rights and overinvestment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 81-95, June.
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- Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana (D.) Sisak, 2018. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-041/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Asymmetry And Collusion In Infinitely Repeated Contests," Working Papers 0509, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Robert Ridlon & Jiwoong Shin, 2013. "Favoring the Winner or Loser in Repeated Contests," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 768-785, September.
- Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests," Working Papers 1184, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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- Caleb Stroup & Matthew L. Gentry, 2017. "Entry and Competition in Takeover Auctions," Working Papers 17-01, Davidson College, Department of Economics.
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