All-Pay Auctions With Asymmetric Effort Constraints
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More about this item
KeywordsAll-pay auctions; asymmetric effort constraints; asymmetric players; weakly asymmetric players;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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