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Report NEP-DES-2020-11-30
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Muhammad Maaz, 2020, "Saturating stable matchings," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2011.06046, Nov, revised Mar 2021.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, V., 2020, "Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 031, Nov, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2020031.
- Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020, "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 104044, Nov.
- Wu, Haoyang, 2020, "The revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 104171, Nov.
- Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020, "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8650.
- Item repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_225v1 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy, 2020, "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Working Papers, CRESE, number 2020-08, Nov.