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Report NEP-DES-2021-03-22
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Bos, Olivier & Pollrich, Martin, 2020, "Optimal auctions with signaling bidders," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-091.
- Bernardo David & Lorenzo Gentile & Mohsen Pourpouneh, 2021, "FAST: Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2021/02, Mar.
- Santiago Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Francisco Castro, 2021, "Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2103.03403, Mar, revised Mar 2022.
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Nicole Immorlica & Yingkai Li & Brendan Lucier, 2021, "Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2103.03980, Mar, revised Nov 2023.
- Yingkai Li, 2021, "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2103.05788, Mar, revised Aug 2023.
- Item repec:isu:genstf:202103100800001123 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Tierney, Ryan, 2021, "Simple Social Choice Rules for Exchange," Discussion Papers on Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics, number 4/2021, Mar.
- François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2023, "Voter coordination in elections : a case for approval voting," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03162184, Nov.
- Item repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2021_256 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Federico Vaccari, 2021, "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2103.05317, Mar, revised Apr 2023.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019, "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2189R3, Aug, revised Nov 2020.
- Lach, Saul & Neeman, Zvika & Schankerman, Mark, 2021, "Government financing of R&D: a mechanism design approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 105873, Aug.