Report NEP-DES-2021-03-22

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Bos, Olivier & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Optimal auctions with signaling bidders," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-091, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
• Bernardo David & Lorenzo Gentile & Mohsen Pourpouneh, 2021. "FAST: Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions," IFRO Working Paper 2021/02, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
• Santiago Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Francisco Castro, 2021. "Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility," Papers 2103.03403, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Nicole Immorlica & Yingkai Li & Brendan Lucier, 2021. "Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation," Papers 2103.03980, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
• Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
• Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202103100800001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
• Tierney, Ryan, 2021. "Simple Social Choice Rules for Exchange," Discussion Papers on Economics 4/2021, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
• François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2023. "Voter coordination in elections : a case for approval voting," PSE Working Papers halshs-03162184, HAL.
• Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2021. "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission Under Limited Awareness," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_256, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers 2103.05317, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
• Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2020.
• Lach, Saul & Neeman, Zvika & Schankerman, Mark, 2021. "Government financing of R&D: a mechanism design approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 105873, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.