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Report NEP-DES-2020-03-09
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020, "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2020_158, Feb.
- Constantinos Daskalakis & Maxwell Fishelson & Brendan Lucier & Vasilis Syrgkanis & Santhoshini Velusamy, 2020, "Multi-item Non-truthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.06702, Feb, revised Sep 2022.
- Yash Kanoria & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2020, "Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.07331, Feb.
- D'avid Csercsik, 2020, "Convex Combinatorial Auction of Pipeline Network Capacities," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.06554, Feb.
- Benjamin Kang & James Unwin, 2020, "All-Pay Auctions as Models for Trade Wars and Military Annexation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.03492, Feb.
- Noelia Juarez & Pablo A. Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2020, "Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.08156, Feb, revised Jun 2020.
- Haris Aziz & Serge Gaspers & Zhaohong Sun & Toby Walsh, 2020, "From Matching with Diversity Constraints to Matching with Regional Quotas," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.06748, Feb.
- Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2020, "Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 98587, Feb.
- Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe J. Tergiman, 2020, "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 26734, Feb.
- Moshe Haviv & Eyal Winter, 2020, "An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.06533, Feb.
- Jin Yeub Kim, 2019, "Neutral Public Good Mechanisms," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2019rwp-159, Dec.
- Item repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_019v2 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020, "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University, number 658.
- Bhavook Bhardwaj & Rajnish Kumar & Josue Ortega, 2020, "Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.03174, Feb, revised Mar 2020.
- Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2020, "The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure," Working Papers, CRESE, number 2020-02, Mar.
- Achille Basile & Surekha Rao & K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, 2020, "The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.06341, Feb, revised Jul 2020.