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Report NEP-DES-2022-07-18
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2022, "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 22-016.
- Meryem Essaidi & Matheus V. X. Ferreira & S. Matthew Weinberg, 2022, "Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2205.14758, May.
- Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022, "Optimal Reserve Prices," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, number 22/07, Mar.
- Chinmay Maheshwari & Eric Mazumdar & Shankar Sastry, 2022, "Decentralized, Communication- and Coordination-free Learning in Structured Matching Markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.02344, Jun.
- Haris Aziz & Alexander Lam & Mashbat Suzuki & Toby Walsh, 2022, "Random Rank: The One and Only Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Randomized Facility Location Mechanism," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2205.14798, May, revised Jun 2022.
- Soroush Ebadian & Anson Kahng & Dominik Peters & Nisarg Shah, 2022, "Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2205.15760, May, revised Jan 2024.