Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
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- Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2022. "Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling," CESifo Working Paper Series 9900, CESifo.
- BOS, Olivier & TRUYTS, Tom, 2016. "Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2016017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2022. "Entry in first-price auctions with signaling," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-016, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IND-2016-06-18 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2016-06-18 (Microeconomics)
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