Auctions with Signaling Concerns
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References listed on IDEAS
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KeywordsCostly signaling; D1 criterion; social status; art auctions; charity auctions.;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-05-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2017-05-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2017-05-28 (Microeconomics)
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