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Delegated Bidding and the Allocative Effects of Alternative Accounting Rules


  • Marinovic, Ivan

    (Stanford University)


I study the efficiency of three prominent accounting rules in a delegated bidding setting where bidders' incentives are tied to both accounting income and economic surplus. Trade efficiency is maximized (minimized) by the value-in-use method (historical cost method). The exit-value method generates an accounting based winner's curse that results in fire-sale-like valuations. Yet, in the limit, as the number of bidders grows large, the efficiency of the exit-value method converges to that of the value-in-use method.

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  • Marinovic, Ivan, 2014. "Delegated Bidding and the Allocative Effects of Alternative Accounting Rules," Research Papers 3251, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:3251

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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2017. "Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-053/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Jul 2017.

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