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Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Bos

    (LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas)

  • Francisco Gomez-Martinez
  • Sander Onderstal

    (UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam = University of Amsterdam)

  • Tom Truyts

Abstract

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the bidders' payments to an outside observer. We find that the all-pay sealed-bid auction in which the bidders' payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Post-Print hal-04120443, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04120443
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal, 2022. "Signalling in auctions for risk-averse bidders," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(10), pages 1-8, October.
    2. Miguel A. Fonseca & Francesco Giovannoni & Miltiadis Makris, 2020. "Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1003-1043, December.
    3. Johan Fourie & Tessa Hubble & Jonathan Schoots, 2025. "The price of status: Findings from Cape auctions," Working Papers 03/2025, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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