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Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling

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  • Molnár, József
  • Virág, Gábor

Abstract

We show that under post-auction market interaction revealing (hiding) information is revenue maximizing if the utility function is convex (concave) in the signaled type. Previous literature considered the sign of the first derivative with respect to the perceived type crucial.

Suggested Citation

  • Molnár, József & Virág, Gábor, 2008. "Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 360-363, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:360-363
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Das Varma, Gopal, 2003. "Bidding for a process innovation under alternative modes of competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 15-37, January.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2001. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1237-1259, September.
    3. Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 214-231, Summer.
    4. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2000. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 768-791, Winter.
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller," MPRA Paper 24374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021. "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 448-469.
    3. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Auctions with signaling concerns," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 420-448, May.
    5. Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A. & Maasland, Emiel, 2011. "Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 594-601, June.
    6. Chattopadhyay, Srobonti & Chatterjee, Rittwik, 2013. "Selling a Cost Reducing Production Technique through Auction in a Duopolistic Industry," MPRA Paper 52010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Oct 2013.
    7. Miguel A. Fonseca & Francesco Giovannoni & Miltiadis Makris, 2020. "Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1003-1043, December.
    8. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching," MPRA Paper 24373, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2096-2123.
    10. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev & Emiel Maasland, 2009. "Auctions with Flexible Entry Fees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-109/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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