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Gábor Virag

Personal Details

First Name:Gábor
Middle Name:
Last Name:Virag
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pvi184
https://sites.google.com/site/gvirag77/
Terminal Degree:2004 Department of Economics; Princeton University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Business Economics
Rotman School of Management
University of Toronto

Toronto, Canada
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/AcademicAreas/BusinessEconomics.aspx

: 416.978.3499

105 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3E6
RePEc:edi:betorca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Galasso, Alberto & Mitchell, Matthew & Virag, Gabor, 2017. "A Theory of Grand Innovation Prizes," CEPR Discussion Papers 11860, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Galasso, Alberto & Mitchell, Matthew & Virag, Gabor, 2014. "Market Outcomes and Dynamic Patent Buyouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 9847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Wolfram Merzyn & Gabor Virag & Stephan Lauermann, 2010. "Aggregate uncertainty and learning in a search model," 2010 Meeting Papers 1235, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Virag, Gabor, 2009. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," MPRA Paper 17094, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Galenianos, Manolis & Kircher, Philipp & Virag, Gabor, 2009. "Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model," MPRA Paper 17093, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Gabor Virag, 2008. "Buyer heterogeneity and competing mechanism," 2008 Meeting Papers 702, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Gabor Virag, 2006. "Outside offers and bidding costs," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0610, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, revised 30 Aug 2006.
  8. Gabor Virag, 2005. "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two-Party Elections," 2005 Meeting Papers 350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Lawrence Uren & Gabor Virag, 2005. "Wage Inequality in a Burdett-Mortensen World," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0518, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  10. Jozsef Molnar & Gabor Virag, 2001. "Optimal auctions with externalities and signaling," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0112, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  11. Gabor Virag, 1999. "Independence of a Regulatory Institution - a Means to Alleviate Credibility Problems in the CEE Countries," CASE-CEU Working Papers 0034, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  12. Gábor Virág, 1998. "Independence of Regulatory Agencies," Rajk László Szakkollégium Working Papers 4, Rajk László College.

Articles

  1. Virág, Gábor, 2016. "Auctions with resale: Reserve prices and revenues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 239-249.
  2. Galasso, Alberto & Mitchell, Matthew & Virag, Gabor, 2016. "Market outcomes and dynamic patent buyouts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 207-243.
  3. Gábor Virág, 2013. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 129-163, January.
  4. Stephan Lauermann & Gábor Virág, 2012. "Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 107-130, November.
  5. Lawrence Uren & Gabor Virag, 2011. "Skill Requirements, Search Frictions, And Wage Inequality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(2), pages 379-406, May.
  6. Virág, Gábor, 2011. "High profit equilibria in directed search models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 224-234, January.
  7. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher & Gábor Virág, 2011. "Market Power And Efficiency In A Search Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(1), pages 85-103, February.
  8. Virág, Gábor, 2010. "Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(2), May.
  9. Virág, Gábor, 2009. "Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 315-330, September.
  10. Raviv, Yaron & Virag, Gabor, 2009. "Gambling by auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 369-378, May.
  11. Molnár, József & Virág, Gábor, 2008. "Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 360-363, May.
  12. Gábor Virág, 2008. "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two-Party Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 891-922, October.
  13. Virag, Gabor, 2007. "Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 156-177, October.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Galasso, Alberto & Mitchell, Matthew & Virag, Gabor, 2014. "Market Outcomes and Dynamic Patent Buyouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 9847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Ganglmair & Timothy Simcoe & Emanuele Tarantino, 2018. "Learning When to Quit: An Empirical Model of Experimentation," NBER Working Papers 24358, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Galasso, Alberto & Mitchell, Matthew & Virag, Gabor, 2018. "A theory of grand innovation prizes," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 343-362.
    3. Bernhard Ganglmair & Timothy Simcoe & Emanuele Tarantino, 2018. "Learning When to Quit: An Empirical Model of Experimentation," Working Papers id:12569, eSocialSciences.

  2. Wolfram Merzyn & Gabor Virag & Stephan Lauermann, 2010. "Aggregate uncertainty and learning in a search model," 2010 Meeting Papers 1235, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Shneyerov, Art & Xie, Huan, 2010. "How Optimism Leads to Price Discovery and Efficiency in a Dynamic Matching Market," Microeconomics.ca working papers artyom_shneyerov-2010-32, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 26 Oct 2010.
    2. Stephan Lauermann & Gábor Virág, 2012. "Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 107-130, November.
    3. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2016. "An optimistic search equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 89-114, June.
    4. Genesove, David & Hansen, James, 2016. "The Role of Auctions and Negotiation in Housing Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 11392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  3. Virag, Gabor, 2009. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," MPRA Paper 17094, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Oguz Karahan & Tolga Umut Kuzubas, 2014. "Auctions with Resale under State Uncertainty," Working Papers 2014/02, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    2. Alex Gershkov & Flavio Toxvaerd, 2013. "On seller estimates and buyer returns," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 47-55, May.
    3. Ding, Wei & Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2013. "Horizontal mergers with synergies: Cash vs. profit-share auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 382-391.
    4. Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2096-2123.
    5. Virág, Gábor, 2016. "Auctions with resale: Reserve prices and revenues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 239-249.

  4. Galenianos, Manolis & Kircher, Philipp & Virag, Gabor, 2009. "Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model," MPRA Paper 17093, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Jacquet, Nicolas L. & Tan, Serene, 2012. "Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1064-1104.
    2. Gabriele Camera & Jaehong Kim, 2016. "Dynamic directed search," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(1), pages 131-154, June.
    3. Eeckhout, Jan & Kircher, Philipp, 2010. "Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 29704, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Sheng Bi & Yuanyuan Li, 2016. "Holdup and hiring discrimination with search friction," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16002, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    5. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2013. "Competing through information provision," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 438-451.
    6. Girum Abebe & Stefano Caria & Marcel Fafchamps & Paolo Falco & Simon Franklin & Simon Quinn, 2017. "Anonymity or Distance? Job Search and Labour Market Exclusion in a Growing African City," SERC Discussion Papers 0224, Spatial Economics Research Centre, LSE.
    7. Randall Wright & Philipp Kircher & Benoit Julîen & Veronica Guerrieri, 2017. "Directed Search: A Guided Tour," NBER Working Papers 23884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2011. "It's About Time: Implications of the Period Length in an Equilibrium Job Search Model," IZA Discussion Papers 6002, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Kim, Kyungmin & Kircher, Philipp, 2012. "Efficient Cheap Talk in Directed Search: On the Non-essentiality of Commitment in Market Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 8759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. BI, Sheng & LI, Yuanyuan, 2015. "Holdup and hiring discrimination with search friction," MPRA Paper 65100, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  5. Gabor Virag, 2005. "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two-Party Elections," 2005 Meeting Papers 350, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 2008. "The Role of Media Slant in Elections and Economics," Working Papers 0802, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    2. Benjamin Ogden, 2017. "The Imperfect Beliefs Voting Model," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-20, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 2008. "Rational Expectations and Media Slant," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001844, UCLA Department of Economics.

  6. Jozsef Molnar & Gabor Virag, 2001. "Optimal auctions with externalities and signaling," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0112, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

    Cited by:

    1. Jozsef Molnar, 2002. "Preemptive Horizontal Mergers: Theory and Evidence," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0213, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Articles

  1. Galasso, Alberto & Mitchell, Matthew & Virag, Gabor, 2016. "Market outcomes and dynamic patent buyouts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 207-243.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Gábor Virág, 2013. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 129-163, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Stephan Lauermann & Gábor Virág, 2012. "Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 107-130, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2016. "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," MPRA Paper 75632, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Wataru Tamura, 2013. "Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle," CARF F-Series CARF-F-330, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    3. Wataru Tamura, 2016. "Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 201-225, June.

  4. Virág, Gábor, 2011. "High profit equilibria in directed search models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 224-234, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Jaehong & Camera, Gabriele, 2014. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in directed search models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 248-267.
    2. Selcuk, Cemil, 2017. "Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 262-285.
    3. Gabriele Camera & Jaehong Kim, 2012. "Buyer's Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility: a Recursive Approach," Working Papers 12-28, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    4. Randall Wright & Philipp Kircher & Benoit Julîen & Veronica Guerrieri, 2017. "Directed Search: A Guided Tour," NBER Working Papers 23884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  5. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher & Gábor Virág, 2011. "Market Power And Efficiency In A Search Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(1), pages 85-103, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Virág, Gábor, 2010. "Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, 2015. "Information Release in Second–Price Auctions," Serie Working Papers 15, Universidad del Desarrollo, School of Business and Economics.
    2. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2015. "On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition," Working Papers 2015-632, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    3. Backus, Matthew R. & Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2014. "Search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 173-192.
    4. Eberhard Feess & Christian Grund & Markus Walzl & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2014. "Competing Trade Mechanisms and Monotone Mechanism Choice," Working Papers 2014-28, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    5. Virág, Gábor, 2011. "High profit equilibria in directed search models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 224-234, January.
    6. Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2016. "Nonstandard bidder behavior in real-world auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 198-212.

  7. Raviv, Yaron & Virag, Gabor, 2009. "Gambling by auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 369-378, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Gallice Andrea, 2016. "Price Reveal Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 485-514, June.
    2. Takashi Yamada & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2016. "An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games," Post-Print halshs-01204814, HAL.
    3. Harold Houba & Dinard Laan & Dirk Veldhuizen, 2011. "Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 269-295, August.
    4. Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "Lowest unique bid auctions with population uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 53-57.
    5. Costa-Gomes, Miguel A. & Shimoji, Makoto, 2014. "Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 16-24.
    6. Rapoport, Amnon & Otsubo, Hironori & Kim, Bora & Stein, William E., 2007. "Unique bid auctions: Equilibrium solutions and experimental evidence," MPRA Paper 4185, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jul 2007.
    7. Peitz, Martin & Waldfogel, Joel, 2012. "The Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195397840.
    8. Eichberger, Jürgen & Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2016. "Efficiency of Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 98-102.
    9. Andrea Gallice, 2008. "Lowest Unique Bid Auctions over the Internet: Ability, Lottery or Scam?," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0608, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
    10. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Penny auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 59-87.
    11. Takashi Yamada & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2015. "An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-34, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    12. Marco Scarsini & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Lowest Unique Bid Auctions," Papers 1007.4264, arXiv.org.
    13. Robert Östling & Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Eileen Y. Chou & Colin F. Camerer, 2011. "Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 1-33, August.
    14. Erik Mohlin & Robert Ostling & Joseph Tao-yi Wang, 2014. "Learning by Imitation in Games: Theory, Field, and Laboratory," Economics Series Working Papers 734, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    15. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2013. "Penny Auctions are Unpredictable," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 305, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

  8. Molnár, József & Virág, Gábor, 2008. "Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 360-363, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller," MPRA Paper 24374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Chattopadhyay, Srobonti & Chatterjee, Rittwik, 2013. "Selling a Cost Reducing Production Technique through Auction in a Duopolistic Industry," MPRA Paper 52010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Oct 2013.
    3. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom, 2017. "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," MPRA Paper 79181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching," MPRA Paper 24373, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A. & Maasland, Emiel, 2011. "Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 594-601, June.
    7. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    8. Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2096-2123.
    9. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev & Emiel Maasland, 2009. "Auctions with Flexible Entry Fees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-109/1, Tinbergen Institute.

  9. Gábor Virág, 2008. "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two-Party Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 891-922, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Virag, Gabor, 2007. "Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 156-177, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    2. Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2013. "Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2009-09-11 2014-06-02 2014-06-14
  2. NEP-INO: Innovation (3) 2014-06-02 2014-06-14 2017-03-12
  3. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (3) 2014-06-02 2014-06-14 2017-03-12
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2014-06-02 2017-03-12
  5. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (2) 2009-09-11 2010-10-30
  6. NEP-TID: Technology & Industrial Dynamics (2) 2014-06-14 2017-03-12
  7. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2009-09-11
  8. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2014-06-14
  9. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2009-09-11
  10. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2017-03-12
  11. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2009-09-11
  12. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2005-12-01

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