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Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions

Author

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  • Paul Pezanis-Christou

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

Abstract

The paper reports on the effects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to be sold in sequence, the seller maximises her expected revenues by selling the most valuable object first. Second, the more the objects are different and the more the sequential format favours the informed bidder. Third, by switching the order of sales, the seller may want to change her initial preference for a simultaneous format (in which bidders submit object-specific bids) to one for a sequential format. Fourth, sequential auctions are mostly preferred by the seller when the objects are likely to be of low value and the precision of the informed bidder's signal is low.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2013. "Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2013-07
    as

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    File URL: https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp2013-07.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    multiple-object auctions; sequential and simultaneous procedures; first-price auctions; asymmetric bidders; multi-unit demands; common value; price trends; order of sales.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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