Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
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- Claudio Mezzetti & Aleksandar Pekec & Ilia Tsetlin, 2005. "Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers in Economics 05/26, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2007.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Aleksandar Pekec & Ilia Tsetlin, 2004. "Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions," Working Papers 2004.147, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2007. "On the Lowest-Winning-Bid and the Highest-Losing-Bid Auctions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 832, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Knaut, Andreas & Paschmann, Martin, 2017. "Decoding Restricted Participation in Sequential Electricity Markets," EWI Working Papers 2017-5, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI), revised 31 Aug 2017.
- Paschmann, Martin, 2017. "Economic Analysis of Price Premiums in the Presence of Non-convexities - Evidence from German Electricity Markets," EWI Working Papers 2017-12, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
- Francesco Giovannoni & Miltiadis Makris, 2014. "Reputational Bidding," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 693-710, August.
- Hu, Audrey & Zou, Liang, 2015. "Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 319-335.
- Victor Ginsburgh & Jan van Ours, 2007. "How to organize a sequential auction: results of a natural experiment by Christie's," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5255, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2013. "Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
- Rosato, Antonio, 2014. "Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the "Afternoon Effect"," MPRA Paper 56824, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
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