Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers
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- Masaki Aoyagi, 2005. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," ISER Discussion Paper 0645, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Aoyagi, Masaki & Bhalla, Manaswini & Gunay, Hikmet, 2016.
"Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 565-600.
- Masaki Aoyagi & Manaswini Bhalla & Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Social Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition," ISER Discussion Paper 0909, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Nicolás Figueroa & Carla Guadalupi, 2017. "Convincing early adopters: Price signals and Information transmission," Documentos de Trabajo 486, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2013. "Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 77-89.
- Alexei Parakhonyak & Nick Vikander, 2013. "Optimal sales schemes for network goods," HSE Working papers WP BRP 41/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
More about this item
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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