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Strategic firms and endogenous consumer emulation

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  • Kircher, Philipp
  • Postlewaite, Andrew

Abstract

Better-informed consumers may be treated preferentially by firms because their consumption serves as a quality signal for other customers. For normal goods this results in wealthy individuals being treated better than poor individuals. We investigate this phenomenon in an equilibrium model of social learning with heterogeneous consumers and firms that act strategically. Consumers search for high-quality firms and condition their choices on observed actions of other consumers. When they observe consumers who are more likely to have identified a high-quality firm, uninformed individuals will optimally emulate those consumers. One group of consumers arise endogenously as “leaders” whose consumption behavior is emulated. Follow-on sales induce firms to give preferential treatment to these lead consumers, which reinforces their learning.

Suggested Citation

  • Kircher, Philipp & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2008. "Strategic firms and endogenous consumer emulation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 29699, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:29699
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    Cited by:

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    2. Amador, Manuel & Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2012. "Learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 910-940.
    3. Carlo Reggiani & Alejandro Saporiti & Lois Simanjuntak, 2018. "Social Information and Consumer Heterogeneity," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1813, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    4. Belleflamme, Paul & Omrani, Nessrine & Peitz, Martin, 2015. "The economics of crowdfunding platforms," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 11-28.
    5. Mueller-Frank, Manuel & M. Pai, Mallesh, 2015. "Do Online Social Networks Increase Welfare?," IESE Research Papers D/1118, IESE Business School.
    6. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Antonio Rosato, 2024. "Quality Is in the Eye of the Beholder: Taste Projection in Markets with Observational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(11), pages 3746-3787, November.
    7. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael & Tsur, Matan, 2018. "Aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 935-956.
    8. Stone, Daniel F. & Miller, Steven J., 2013. "Leading, learning and herding," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 222-231.
    9. Daniel Garcia & Sandro Shelegia, 2018. "Consumer search with observational learning," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 224-253, March.
    10. Daniel Garcia & Sandro Shelegia, 2018. "Consumer search with observational learning," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 224-253, March.
    11. Friedrichsen, Jana, 2016. "Signals sell: Designing a product line when consumers have social image concerns," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

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    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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