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The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

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  • Gill, David
  • Sgroi, Daniel

Abstract

We develop a framework in which: (i) a firm can have a new product tested publicly before launch; and (ii) tests vary in toughness, holding expertise fixed. Price flexibility boosts the positive impact on consumer beliefs of passing a tough test and mitigates the negative impact of failing a soft test. As a result, profits are convex in toughness: the firm selects either the toughest or softest test available. The toughest test is optimal when consumers start with an unfavorable prior and receive sufficiently uninformative private signals (an “innovative” product); the softest test is optimal when signals are sufficiently informative.

Suggested Citation

  • Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2012. "The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1247-1260.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:3:p:1247-1260
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.019
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Test; Reviewer; Certification; Bayesian learning; Information transmission; Marketing; Product launch; Bias; Tough test; Soft test;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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