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The role of mandatory and voluntary joint bidding in promoting efficiency in conservation auction

Author

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  • Anne Stenger

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Jens Abildtrup

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Géraldine Bocquého

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Kene Boun My

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Tuyen Tong Tiet

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We conduct a lab experiment to investigate the impact of voluntary and mandatory joint-bidding schemes on the performance of conservation auctions. Our results suggest that joint bidding increases auction performance compared to the singlebidding baseline. Within the voluntary joint-bidding conditions, a bonus payment incentive improves auction performance by encouraging the subjects to give low bids. However, voluntary joint bidding performs worse than mandatory joint bidding, even with the bonus incentive. Therefore, when implementing voluntary joint bids to ensure high acceptability from landowners compared to mandatory ones, policymakers should carefully consider performance issues.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Stenger & Jens Abildtrup & Géraldine Bocquého & Kene Boun My & Tuyen Tong Tiet, 2023. "The role of mandatory and voluntary joint bidding in promoting efficiency in conservation auction," Post-Print hal-04208245, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04208245
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04208245v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

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