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Tradable Set-Aside Requirements (TSARs): Conserving Spatially Dependent Environmental Amenities

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  • Parkhurst, Gregory M
  • Shogren, Jason F
  • Crocker, Thomas

Abstract

In the lab, we examine the effectiveness of two land use conservation policies: a tradable set aside requirements (TSARs), and the TSARs combined with an agglomeration bonus. Evaluated by bioeconomic efficiency, our experimental results suggest: 1) TSARs is a cost-effective land conservation tool; and 2) combining TSARS with the agglomeration bonus increases habitat connectivity but at a price—lower economic efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Parkhurst, Gregory M & Shogren, Jason F & Crocker, Thomas, 2011. "Tradable Set-Aside Requirements (TSARs): Conserving Spatially Dependent Environmental Amenities," MPRA Paper 34555, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34555
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:renvpo:v:12:y:2018:i:1:p:69-91. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Cooke, Benjamin & Moon, Katie, 2015. "Aligning ‘public good’ environmental stewardship with the landscape-scale: Adapting MBIs for private land conservation policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 152-158.
    3. Justin Dijk & Erik Ansink & Daan van Soest, 2017. "Buyouts and Agglomeration Bonuses in Wildlife Corridor Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-036/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conservation; tradable development rights; spatial conservation; market instruments;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • Q27 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Issues in International Trade

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