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Assessing Collective Measures in Rural Policy: The Effect of Minimum Participation Rules on the Distribution of Benefits from Irrigation Infrastructure

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  • Matteo Zavalloni

    () (Department of Agricultural Sciences, University of Bologna, Viale Fanin 50, 40127 Bologna, Italy)

  • Meri Raggi

    () (Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Bologna, via delle Belle Arti 41, 40126 Bologna, Italy)

  • Davide Viaggi

    () (Department of Agricultural Sciences, University of Bologna, Viale Fanin 50, 40127 Bologna, Italy)

Abstract

Despite the increasing interest from both policy makers and scholars in the collective management of natural resources in the rural sector, the literature has not covered many aspects of the incentives targeting collective actors. In this article, we analyze how embedding minimum participation rules in rural policies affect the distribution of benefits of a group of players that cooperate. The article applies the Shapley Value and the Nash–Harsanyi solution, two of the key solutions of cooperative game theory, to an incentive scheme in Emilia-Romagna (Italy) to support the construction of collective reservoirs for irrigation water. Results show that rules on the minimum storage capacity and on the minimum number of users affect the benefit distribution in opposite directions. The main conclusion of the article is that minimum participation rules should be carefully designed if welfare distribution is an issue. However, further studies are required to have a comprehensive assessment of minimum participation rules within rural policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2016. "Assessing Collective Measures in Rural Policy: The Effect of Minimum Participation Rules on the Distribution of Benefits from Irrigation Infrastructure," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:9:y:2016:i:1:p:1-:d:85897
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shapley Value; Nash–Harsanyi; agricultural policies; collective incentives; reservoir; cooperation; agglomeration bonus;

    JEL classification:

    • Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics
    • Q0 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

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