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Patterns of multi-agent land conservation: Crowding in/out, agglomeration, and policy

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  • Albers, Heidi J.
  • Ando, Amy W.
  • Batz, Michael

Abstract

Private agents make large contributions to networks of conserved land, but little is known about how private agents' decisions might be altered by government actions. This paper explores the impact of public conservation and public policy on the quantity and configuration of private land conservation and the extent to which the social optimum is reached. Because land conservation benefits often have thresholds and spatial characteristics, we consider the impact of different land conservation benefit functions on the patterns of conservation created by the interaction of private and public agents. We find that public conservation crowds private conservation in or out depending on whether marginal conservation benefits increase or decrease with total acreage, and crowding out is mitigated by the presence of budget constraints. We show how land conservation agents might interact strategically in space depending on preferences over fragmentation, and we explore that spatial strategic interaction in a case with a regional land trust and a case with hot-spot parcels. We identify when government policies, such as agglomeration bonuses and mitigating coordination costs, are most likely to increase the social benefits provided by private land conservation agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Albers, Heidi J. & Ando, Amy W. & Batz, Michael, 2008. "Patterns of multi-agent land conservation: Crowding in/out, agglomeration, and policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 492-508, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:4:p:492-508
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Heidi Albers & Amy Ando & Meidan Bu & Michael Wing, 2012. "Road-network agglomeration, road density, and protected-area fragmentation," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 137-150, October.
    2. Gregory M. Parkhurst & Jason F. Shogren & Thomas Crocker, 2016. "Tradable Set-Aside Requirements (TSARs): Conserving Spatially Dependent Environmental Amenities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 719-744, April.
    3. Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z. & Albers, Heidi J. & Kirama, Stephen L., 2012. "The Role of Incentives for Sustainable Implementation of Marine Protected Areas: An Example from Tanzania," Discussion Papers dp-12-03-efd, Resources For the Future.
    4. Gwenlyn M. Busby & Heidi J. Albers & Claire A. Montgomery, 2012. "Wildfire Risk Management in a Landscape with Fragmented Ownership and Spatial Interactions," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 88(3), pages 496-517.
    5. Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2016. "Assessing Collective Measures in Rural Policy: The Effect of Minimum Participation Rules on the Distribution of Benefits from Irrigation Infrastructure," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, December.
    6. repec:spr:masfgc:v:23:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11027-016-9736-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:eee:ecomod:v:249:y:2013:i:c:p:19-25 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Maarten Punt & Hans-Peter Weikard & Ekko Ierland & Jan Stel, 2012. "Large Scale Marine Protected Areas for Biodiversity Conservation Along a Linear Gradient: Cooperation, Strategic Behavior or Conservation Autarky?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 203-228, October.
    9. Bell, Andrew & Parkhurst, Gregory & Droppelmann, Klaus & Benton, Tim G., 2016. "Scaling up pro-environmental agricultural practice using agglomeration payments: Proof of concept from an agent-based model," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 32-41.
    10. Lawley, Chad & Yang, Wanhong, 2015. "Spatial interactions in habitat conservation: Evidence from prairie pothole easements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 71-89.

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