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Minimum participation rules in international environmental agreements: empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations

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  • Martin Kesternich

Abstract

Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a data set from a worldwide survey among delegates in international climate negotiations, this article assesses preferences for different MPRs for a future climate treaty among key players. The empirical findings provide evidence that small countries with low bargaining power rather opt for large minimum membership requirements while industrialized countries push forward the idea of a small carbon club of the largest emitters only. In contrast, delegates from countries in transition try to keep emission thresholds rather low which would allow a future agreement to come into force without their signature.

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  • Martin Kesternich, 2016. "Minimum participation rules in international environmental agreements: empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(12), pages 1047-1065, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:48:y:2016:i:12:p:1047-1065
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1093082
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2015.1093082
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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