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Agri-environmental policies for biodiversity when the spatial pattern of the reserve matters

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  • Bamière, Laure
  • David, Maia
  • Vermont, Bruno

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to compare different environmental policies for cost-effective habitat conservation on agricultural lands, when the desired spatial pattern of reserves is a random mosaic. We use a spatially explicit mathematical programming model which studies the farmers' behavior as profit maximizers under technical and administrative constraints. Facing different policy measures, each farmer chooses the land-use on each field, which determines the landscape at the regional level. A spatial pattern index (Ripley L function) is then associated to the obtained landscape, indicating on the degree of dispersion of the reserve. We compare a subsidy per hectare of reserve with an auction scheme and an agglomeration malus. We find that the auction is superior to the uniform subsidy for cost-efficiency. The agglomeration malus does better than the auction for the spatial pattern but is more costly.

Suggested Citation

  • Bamière, Laure & David, Maia & Vermont, Bruno, 2013. "Agri-environmental policies for biodiversity when the spatial pattern of the reserve matters," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 97-104.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:85:y:2013:i:c:p:97-104
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.11.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Guy Meunier, 2014. "Land-sparing vs Land-sharing with incomplete policies," Working Papers 2014-05, Alimentation et Sciences Sociales.
    2. Nuppenau, Ernst-August, 2015. "Management of Ecosystem Services with a Focus on Biodiversity: Financing and Paying Services at Spatial Level in Landscapes," 150th Seminar, October 22-23, 2015, Edinburgh, Scotland 212653, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    3. Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2016. "Assessing Collective Measures in Rural Policy: The Effect of Minimum Participation Rules on the Distribution of Benefits from Irrigation Infrastructure," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, December.
    4. Krawczyk, Michał & Bartczak, Anna & Hanley, Nick & Stenger, Anne, 2016. "Buying spatially-coordinated ecosystem services: An experiment on the role of auction format and communication," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 36-48.
    5. Simanti Banerjee & Anthony Kwasnica & James Shortle, 2015. "Information and Auction Performance: A Laboratory Study of Conservation Auctions for Spatially Contiguous Land Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(3), pages 409-431, July.
    6. Justin Dijk & Erik Ansink & Daan van Soest, 2017. "Buyouts and Agglomeration Bonuses in Wildlife Corridor Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-036/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agri-environmental policies; Biodiversity; Spatial pattern; Mathematical programming; Auction schemes; Agglomeration bonus/malus;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
    • Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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